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deadly trap for their clients. As unpalatable and unjust as it is, under the
current fourth circuit interpretation, caution dictates that defense attorneys file a writ of habeas corpus within the 180 day time period.
Summary and Analysis by:
Craig B. Lane
949 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Va. 1996); Wrightv.Angelone, 944 F. Supp. 460
(E.D. Va. 1996); Satcher v. Netherland, 944 F. Supp. 1222 (E.D. Va.
1996); & Zuern v. Tate, 938 F. Supp. 468 (S.D. Ohio 1996).

MU'MIN v. PRUETT
1997 WL 597978 (4th Cir. Aug. 18, 1997)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS

Dawud Majid Mu'Min was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for killing a store owner. The murder occurred while
Mu'Min was out on work detail from a state correctional facility, where
he was serving 48 years imprisonment for first-degree murder. 1 Prior to
trial, Mu'Min's counsel moved for a change of venue, based upon
potentially harmful pretrial publicity. 2 The trialjudge deferred action on
the change of venue motion, and after finding that an impartial jury had
been impaneled, the judge denied the motion.3 The judge also denied
Mu'Min's motion in limine to exclude an order memorializing his
previous first-degree murder conviction. 4 During the sentencing phase,
the jury sent a note to the judge inquiring as to the meaning of "life
imprisonment." 5 The judge declined to answer the question and advised
the jury not to concern itself with the issue.6 Mu'Min's counsel did not
object to the court's refusal to answer the jury's question.7 Upon finding
both the future dangerousness and vileness predicates, 8 the jury imposed
a sentence of death.9
On direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia, Mu'Min did not
challenge either the judge's denial of his motion for change of venue or
thejudge's failure to answer thejury's written question, but did challenge
the judge's denial of his motion in limine, arguing that the prejudicial
impact ofthe order outweighed its probative value. 10 The supreme court
denied relief and upheld the conviction and sentence. 11 The United

States Supreme Court granted certiorarito consider an unrelated issue
12
and ultimately concluded that the trial court had not erred.
Mu'Min next sought relief on state habeas, asserting ineffective
assistance of counsel and several other claims. 13 The state habeas court
found Mu'Min's ineffective assistance of counsel claim to be without
merit and found that the remainder of his claims had either been
previously determined, and thus could not be heard in a state habeas
hearing, or were procedurally defaulted. 14 Subsequently, the Supreme
Court of Virginia denied review, and the United States Supreme Court
denied Mu'Min's petition for a writ of certiorari.15
In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in United States District
Court, Mu'Min challenged, as violations of his Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment Rights to a fair trial and due process, the trial court's denial
of his motion for a change of venue, admission of the order that
memorialized his first-degree murder conviction, and refusal to respond
to the jury's question. 16 The magistrate recommended that the district
court dismiss Mu'Min's petition based on the state supreme court's
reliance on the Slayton v. Parrigan17 procedural default rule, which, in
essence, dictates that issues not properly raised at trial or on direct appeal
are procedurally defaulted and may not be considered in habeas. 18 The
magistrate also found that because Mu'Min had not excused his defaults,
his claims did not merit habeas review. The district court followed the
magistrate's recommendation and dismissed Mu'Min's petition.

12

IMu'Min v. Pruett,1997 WL597978 (4thCir. Aug. 18,1997) at *1.
2
Mu'Min, 1997 WL 597978, at *1.
3Id.
4 Id. Most likely, the prosecutors sought to admit this order to
establish Mu'Min's status as an escapee at the time of the commission of
the crime.
5Id.at *2.
6
Mu'Min, 1997 WL 597978, at *2.
7
Id.
8See Va. Code § 19.2-264.2 (1995).
9
Mu'Min, 1997 WL 597978, at *2.
10
ld.
111d. See Mu'Min v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 433,389 S.E.2d 886
(1990).

Mu'Min, 1997 WL 597978, at *2. See Mu'Min v. Virginia,500
U.S.415, 111 S.Ct. 1899,114 L.Ed.2d493 (1991), rehearingdenied,501
U.S. 1269, 112 S.Ct. 13, 115 L.Ed.2d 1097 (1991).
13 Id.
14
Id.
15
Mu'Min, 1997 WL 597978, at *2. See Mu'Min v. Murray, 511
U.S. 1026, 114 S.Ct. 1416, 128 L.Ed.2d 87 (1994).
16Id. Mu'Min based his claim that the court had erred in refusing
to respond to the jury's question upon Simmons v. South Carolina,512
U.S. 154 (1994) (holding that when future dangerousness is at issue, the
defense counsel should be permitted to introduce evidence pertaining to
a defendant's parole eligibility or ineligibility).
17 215 Va. 27, 29-30, 205 S.E.2d 680, 682 (1974) (issues not
properly raised at trial or on direct appeal are thus procedurally defaulted
and may
not be considered in habeas).
18
Mu'Min, 1997 WL 597978, at *2.
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On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, Mu'Min advanced two arguments in support ofhis assertion that
his claims were not procedurally defaulted. 19 First, Mu'Min contended
that because the Slayton procedural default rule precludes consideration
of claims that are independent of federal law, his claims, grounded in the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, should not be defaulted. Second,
Mu'Min argued that even if the Slayton rule did constitute an adequate
and independent state law basis for a decision, the Supreme Court of
Virginia's mandatory review of his death sentence pursuant to Virginia
20
law constituted an implicit consideration and rejection of his claims.
Finally, Mu'Min argued that even if his claims were procedurally
defaulted, he had established cause and prejudice to excuse the defaultby
21
virtue of his counsel's ineffective assistance on direct appeal.
HOLDING
In an unpublished opinion, the United States Court of Appeals,
Fourth Circuit, reaffirmed several of its previous cases deeming the
Slayton procedural default rule to be an adequate and independent state
law ground for decision. 22 Further, the court reaffirmed the propriety of
applying Slayton to federal constitutional claims which, although they
mighthave been raised on appeal, werenot.23 The court ofappeals found
that the state supreme court's reliance on Slayton nullified Mu'Min's
argument of implicit consideration under the statutory mandatory review.24 The court of appeals declined to apply Simmons because
Mu'Min's conviction became final before Simmons was decided. It
indicated that even if the rule enunciated in Simmons applied, it would
not have obliged the trial court to answer the jury's question concerning
life imprisonment. 25 The court of appeals held that the trial court had not
erred in refusing to allow Mu'Min's counsel to question potential jurors
regarding the content of pretrial publicity to which they had been

19

Id. at *3.
20 Va. Code § 17-110.1(C)(1) (1996). This statute mandates the
Virginia Supreme Court's review of a death sentence to determine
whether "the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of
passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor." See infra, Part I.
21
Mu'Min, 1997WL597978, at*5. See Stricklandv. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984) (setting forth the standard for constitutionally
effective assistance of counsel).
22
1d. at *4. See Bennett v. Angelone, 92 F.3d 1336 (4th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 65 USLW 3396, 117 S.Ct. 503, 136 L.Ed.2d 395 (1996);
Turner v. Williams, 35 F.3d 872 (4th Cir. 1994), overruled in part on
othergrounds by O'Dell v. Netherland,95 F.3d 1214 (4th Cir. 1996) (en
banc), aff d, 117 S.Ct. 1969 (1997). See also case summary of Bennett
v. Angelone, Cap. Def. J., Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 26.
23
Mu'Min, 1997 WL 597978, at *4.
24 Id. The Supreme Court of Virginia's consideration (albeit
implicit) of Mu'Min's constitutional claims would have preserved these
claims and disarmed the Commonwealth's claim that Slayton barred the
court's consideration of his claims. Here, the court of appeals specifically stated that in conducting its mandatory review pursuant to Section
17-110.1 (C)(1), the Supreme Court of Virginia considers "only whether
the imposition of the death penalty was influenced by improper considerations; the provision simply does not require the court to examine the
record for constitutional errors on appeal." Id. Ostensibly, the court
made this remarkable statement to indicate that the scope of the supreme
court's mandatory review is rather narrow and may not be interpreted
more broadly in support of a defendant's claim that a constitutional issue
was considered and rejected.
25
Mu'Min, 1997 WL 597978, at *6.

exposed. 26 Finally, the court held that Mu'Min's failure to particularize
his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on state habeas by citing his
counsel's failure to raise a particular issue on direct appeal (in this
instance, the due process violation resulting from the trial court's
admission of the 1973 order) nullified his assertion of that claim to show
cause for procedural default. 27 In considering Mu'Min's claim of
prejudice resulting from the two issues eligible for its consideration,
counsel's failure to appeal the denial of his motion for change of venue
and to object to the court's refusal to define "life imprisonment," the
court found that Mu'Min showed neither prejudice with regard to the
28
former nor a right to relief with regard to the latter.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. About Virginia Code Section 17-110.1-(C)(1)
A.

What is Mandatory about the Supreme Court of Virginia's
Review Pursuant to Virginia Code Section 17110.1(C)(1)?

Virginia Code Section 17-110.1 (C)(1) has not generated a substantial amount of controversy or commentary since its enactment in 1977.
The provision requires the Supreme Court of Virginia in any case in
which the death penalty has been imposed to review the trial record to
ascertain whether "the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor." 29 Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court of Virginia's mandatory review under this
statute has, almost without exception, yielded the simple conclusion that
nothing in the record indicates that the death sentence was imposed under
the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. The
supreme court's reluctance to find the influence of such a factor is
evidenced by the factual circumstances as described in the few opinions
in which the court actually comments upon the content of its mandatory
30
review before rejecting the defendant's claim under this statute.
In Mu'Min's case, the court of appeals set forth a rather narrow
interpretation of the obligation imposed upon the supreme court by the
statute. The court of appeals stated that, "in conducting its mandatory
review of the death sentence pursuant to § 17-1 10.1(C)(1), the Supreme
Court of Virginia ascertains only whether the imposition of the death
penalty was influenced by improper considerations; the provision simply
does not require the court to examine the record for constitutional errors
not specified on appeal." 3 1 The court restricted the meaning of the
statutory language in order to reach its desired conclusion: a defendant
should not have the ability to revive procedurally defaulted claims, even
in the face ofclear constitutional error, by virtue of a statute requiring the
supreme court's automatic review of the imposition of death sentences.
In light of Mu'Min's argument that the Supreme Court of Virginia
had implicitly considered his constitutional claims by virtue of its
mandatory review under this statute, this semantic juggling is quite
transparent. A review of the record in search of the impermissible
influence of passion, prejudice, and other arbitrary factors, by definition,
would arguably include the requisite constitutional inquiry offundamental fairness. It would seem that a proper determination of whether such
26

Id.
1d. at *5.
28
Mu'Min, 1997 WL 597978, at *5, *6.
29 Va. Code § 17-110.1(C)(1) (1996).
30
See Dubois v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 260, 435 S.E.2d 636
(1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1012, 114 S.Ct. 1389, 128 L.Ed.2d 63
(1994); Stockton v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 192,402 S.E.2d 196, cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 902, 112 S.Ct. 280, 116 L.Ed.2d 231 (1991).
31Mu'Min, 1997 WL 597978, at *4 (emphasis added).
27
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constitutional errors existed necessarily would have included an assessment of the trial court's entry of the order and denial of the motion for
change of venue, both of which Mu'Min sought to challenge before the
court of appeals based upon their prejudicial impact. Yet, even if the
supreme court did undertake the requisite inquiry at the time, it did not
explicitly recognize such issues as "his claims," for he had not yet made
those claims. Thus, it is worth noting that the court of appeals probably
could have achieved its desired result on that basis, without resorting to
the argument that it utilized which denied that the supreme court should
have considered the very issues that Mu'Min asked the court to deem
preserved.
B.

Whether the Supreme Court of Virginia's "Review"
32
Complies with the Mandate of Furman v. Georgia

In enacting Virginia Code Section 17-110.0(C)(1), the legislature
sought to implement Furman's mandates. The statute imposes an
affirmative obligation upon the state supreme court which is not constitutionally mandated in that specific form. Yet, it is clear that if the
supreme court does not recognize an obligation under the statute to
consider constitutional errors not specified on appeal, its reading of the
statutory provision regarding "prejudice" and "arbitrary factors" is not
consonant with Furman's spirit or its enunciation of constitutional
requirements. Under the Virginia statutory scheme, the Supreme Court
of Virginia is essentially charged with the responsibility of actualizing
the constitutional requirements set forth in Furman. In essence, the
legislature designated the state supreme court as the party responsible for
the state's compliance with Furman, which entails ensuring that the
death penalty is not imposed arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or wantonly.
Therefore, if the supreme court does not, as a part of its mandatory
review, recognize its obligation to cure any constitutional error covered
by Furman,regardless of whether such errors were specified on appeal,
then the state of Virginia's procedure does not satisfy Furman's mandate. The supreme court's willingness to sacrifice constitutional claims
of grave importance to procedural default in such an exceedingly facile
manner seems violative of the spirit of Furman, as well as its explicit
mandate.
The intersection (or lack thereof) between Furman'smandates and
the Supreme Court of Virginia's defacto interpretation and conduct of
its mandatory review under the state statute seems to be a territory worth
exploring in future capital cases. Capital counsel in Virginia should
pursue this admittedly complex issue, for such efforts could force the
supreme court to conduct a more meaningful statutory and constitutional
review.

ff.

33
The Narrowing Scope of Simmons

In Simmons, the United States Supreme Court held that when future
dangerousness is at issue, the defense counsel should be permitted to
introduce evidence pertaining to the defendant's parole eligibility or
ineligibility. In Mu'Min, the court of appeals did not apply Simmons
retroactively. 34 The court of appeals did signify that its interpretation of
the Simmons holding would limit its application to cases in which trial
counsel offers evidence ofa defendant's parole ineligibility and preclude
its application to cases in which the jury requests the information on its
own. 35 This restrictive view must be heeded in formulating trial strategy
36
within the Fourth Circuit.
In light of this narrow reading of Simmons, when future dangerousness is at issue, trial counsel must initiate the introduction of evidence of
the defendant's parole ineligibility. 37 Because Simmons was decided
relatively recently, it remains to be seen which interpretation of its
holding will be sanctioned by the Supreme Court. Thus far, Mu'Min's
counsel has not petitioned for certiorarion this issue or any other.
111. The Importance of Being Earnest In Seeking to Avoid
Waiver
In general, this case underscores the crucial importance of aggressively seeking to preserve issues and avoid waiver.38 The court of
appeals denied Mu'Min's right to present his substantive claims on their
merits, attributing this default to his appellate counsel's failure, in
asserting the ineffectiveness of trial counsel, to raise with particularity all
of the issues that his trial counsel had failed to raise, along with his failure
to preserve his substantive claims on federal grounds. Virginia's
prevailing statutory scheme, as interpreted and glossed by the courts, is
an almost inscrutable maze. All too often, the appellate courts indulge
every presumption in favor of default. Thus, capital defense attorneys
should strive to be vigilant in seeking to preserve issues for their clients,
as the obstacles to establishing both cause and prejudice are, by design,
nearly insurmountable. For example, the court found that even if
Mu'Min had shown cause, he could not show prejudice. 39 To demonstrate prejudice, Mu'Min would have had to show, at a minimum, that
appeal of the motion's denial would have been successful. 40 The court
did not set forth a formula by which any court could decide that such an
appeal would have been successful. This example illustrates the difficulty of reviving procedurally defaulted claims and emphasizes the
importance of preserving issues from the very beginning of a case.
Summary and Analysis by:
Anne E. Duprey

33

See supra, note 16.
See O'Dellv. Netherland,95 F.3d 1214 (4th Circ. 1996) (holding
that Simmons constituted a new rule).
35
Mu'Min, WL 597978, at *5. The court utilized text from Justice
O'Connor's concurrence in setting forth its explication of the case's
holding, rather than accepting the majority opinion's text as the defimitive indication of the holding.
36
Id.
37 See Jenio, "Life" = Life: CorrectingJurorMisconceptions,Cap.
Def. J., this issue (setting forth the proposition that even when future
dangerousness is not at issue, counsel should still strive vigorously to
introduce evidence of parole ineligibility in mitigation).
38 Again, trial counsel must also be aggressive in securing the
benefits accordedby favorable Supreme Court decisions such asSimmons.
39
Mu'Min, WL 597978, at *5.
40 Id.
34

32408 U.S. 238,92 S.Ct. 2726,33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972) (holding that
under then-existing state capital sentencing schemes, the death penalty
was being imposed arbitrarily, discriminatorily, and wantonly, and
therefore the imposition of the death penalty violated the Eight Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment).

